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The EUWAB-project (European Union Welfare Effects of Agricultural Biotechnology) 
 
Since 1995, genetically modified organisms have been 
introduced commercially into US agriculture.  These 
innovations are developed and commercialised by a 
handful of vertically coordinated “life science” firms who 
have fundamentally altered the structure of the seed 
industry.  Enforcement of intellectual property rights for 
biological innovations has been the major incentive for 
a concentration tendency in the upstream sector.  Due 
to their monopoly power, these firms are capable of 
charging a “monopoly rent”, extracting a part of the 
total social welfare.  In the US, the first ex post welfare 
studies reveal that farmers and input suppliers are receiving the largest part of the benefits.  
However, up to now no parallel ex ante study has been published for the European Union.  
Hence, the EUWAB-project (European Union Welfare effects of Agricultural Biotechnology) 
aims at calculating the total benefits of selected AgBiotech innovations in the EU and their 
distribution among member countries, producers, processors, consumers, input suppliers and 
government.  This project (VIB/TA-OP/98-07) is financed by the VIB - Flanders 
Interuniversitary Institute for Biotechnology, in the framework of its Technology Assessment 
Programme.  VIB is an autonomous biotech research institute, founded in 1995 by the 
Government of Flanders.  It combines 9 university departments and 5 
associated laboratories. More than 750 researchers and technicians are 
active within various areas of biotech research.  VIB has three major 
objectives: to perform high quality research, to validate research results and 
technology and to stimulate a well-structured social dialogue on 
biotechnology.  Address: VIB vzw, Rijvisschestraat 120,    B-9052 Gent, 
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Abstract 
Some of the crucial assumptions of applied welfare economics do not hold any longer 
in the case of agricultural biotechnology innovations.  We review some modifications 
to the conventional methodologies measuring the size and distribution of agricultural 
research benefits, which are critical for the assessment of the economic impact of 
agricultural biotechnology in the European Union.  While some modifications are 
related to the specific features of modern agricultural biotechnology and technology 
adoption, others are related to the specific institutional settings of the European 
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Introduction 
Already in the mid eighties, a decade before the adoption of the current wave of 
agricultural biotechnology innovations, Fishel (1985) expressed concern about the 
adequacy of conventional analytical techniques to examine the impact of modern 
agricultural biotechnology.  He even advanced the need to reexamine the 
philosophical conceptualisation about how technology assessment studies of 
biotechnology are considered and contends that there must be some analytical 
extensions to these methodologies in order to generate the kind of information that is 
going to be required by decision and policy makers.   
 
Beginning with the early contribution of Griliches (1957), an extensive literature has 
developed about the measurement of the size and distribution of agricultural research 
benefits.  This literature has been reviewed and summarized by Alston et al. (1995).  
At the centre of this literature is a partial equilibrium market model for a commodity, 
with competition in both factor and product markets.  A research-induced technical 
change is modelled as a shift of the commodity supply function, and Marshallian 
producer and consumer surplus measures are used to evaluate the welfare 
consequences of the given supply shift.   
 
However, developments in the market structures of the up- and downstream sectors 
surrounding the farm sector, cast doubts on some crucial assumptions of this 
modelling approach.  As a result, the modelling framework has been continuously 
reshaped, adapted and completed.  While some modifications are related to the 
specific features of modern agricultural biotechnology, others are related to the 
institutional settings of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).   5
Only by diffusion and on-farm adoption can agricultural innovations pass on benefits 
to society.  Figure 1 represents the agbiotech diffusion chain, to which we will refer 
throughout the paper.  Government can influence the speed, extent and benefits of 
adoption through five policy instruments: research expenditures, IPR legislation, 
regulatory approval, labelling policy and trade regulation.  Several factors influence 
government policy decisions: geography, history, religious and socio-cultural aspects, 
political ideology, and national and international institutional context.  However, 
action and information flows (dashed lines) from activists, lobby groups, media and 
consumers have proven to be important in influencing government decisions, 
especially in the EU.  The upstream sector of input suppliers covers a whole set of 
actors: public national agricultural research systems (universities and institutes), 
international agricultural research centres (e.g. the CGIAR) and private biotechnology 
companies.  The structure of this sector (perfect versus imperfect competition or 
monopoly) determines price and purchase conditions of agricultural inputs and, 
indirectly, profitability of the farm sector.  First wave agbiotech innovations generate 
some benefits and costs at the farm level, as has been demonstrated by numerous 
micro-economic  ex post studies in the US.  These effects flow from farmers to 
consumers to an extent that depends on the market structure of the intermediate 
marketing sector (processors, distribution, retailers, and so forth).  In the long run, 
profitability of the innovated technology depends on the structural characteristics of 
the agricultural commodity market as well as exogenous parameters (government 
policy, trade, economic growth, income, etc.).  In conclusion, Figure 1 shows that a 
total system approach is required in order to assess total benefits and costs of 
agbiotech innovations.  Consumers (food safety, the “right to know”) and 
environment (benefits and risks) play a crucial role in this assessment.     6
Imperfect Competition in the Output Market 
While the implications in a competitive market setting are now well known, relatively 
little work has been done on the effects on research benefits of distortions arising 
from imperfect competition in markets for agricultural commodities (downstream 
marketing system in Figure 1).  The limited existent literature indicates that imperfect 
competition could have significant effects on the size and distribution of research 
benefits.  However, most of this literature has assumed extreme forms of imperfect 
competition (monopoly or monopsony) that seem at least as inappropriate as one of 
perfect competition. 
 
Alston et al. (1997) propose a model that allows for more realistic representations of 
oligopsony or oligopoly behaviour in the processing industry and a parameterisation 
of such a model that gives some indication of the quantitative effects on research 
benefits of given departures from perfect competition.  They study the effects on the 
magnitude and distribution of research benefits of a wide range of degrees of 
oligopsony power of processing firms in buying raw farm products and oligopoly 
power in selling processed farm products.  The authors conclude that a competitive 
processing sector operating under constant returns to scale captures none of the 
research benefits.  However, firms with market power will restrict the output 
expansion, caused by technological change, relative to what it would be under perfect 
competition (creating an artificial scarcity), which will increase the deadweight loss 
from market power.  This increase in deadweight loss represents the benefits from the 
innovations that are foregone due to imperfect competition in the marketing sector.  
Research benefits under imperfect competition will be equal to the corresponding 
benefits under competition minus any increase in the deadweight loss associated with   7
market power caused by the research-induced supply shift.  This deadweight loss is 
determined jointly by the degree of monopoly (monopsony) and by the elasticity of 
the demand (supply) function.  As market demand becomes more inelastic relative to 
market supply, the processors’ share in the total benefits will increase if processors’ 
market power is relatively greater in the output market, enabling them to better exploit 
the relative inelasticity of demand.  Farmers are made worse off by an increase in 
processor oligopoly power because the incremental output contraction it implies will 
also diminish demand for their raw product.  Similarly, consumers’ welfare is also 
diminished by an increase in the extent of either oligopoly or oligopsony power. 
 
Since concentration in the marketing sector is very common in the European 
agribusiness chain, agbiotech impact studies have to take into account the possibility 
that this sector diminishes total benefits and extracts a part of them, at the expense of 
other agents in the agbiotech diffusion chain: producers, consumers and input 
suppliers (Figure 1).  Up to now, the only contribution incorporating the assumption 
of imperfectly competitive markets in their agbiotech impact analysis is the recent 
study of Nadolnyak and Sheldon (2001).  Their paper models the distributional effects 
of partial adoption of genetically modified soybeans under the assumption of 
imperfect competition in the soybean processing market.  In doing so, the authors 
show the welfare costs of market imperfections due to the fact that market power 
slows the adoption process, but maintains a higher level of traditional soybean 
production.  Thus, for our case studies it is important to study the market structure of 
the downstream sector in order to identify the existence and degree of market power 
which influences the size and distribution of the research benefits due to the adoption 
of agbiotech.   8
Imperfect Competition in the Input Market 
While relatively little work has been done on imperfect competition in the output 
market (cfr. supra), no work at all existed on imperfect competition in the input 
market until 1997.  Before, research benefits were estimated assuming that the 
research is publicly funded and competitively sold in the input market.  Figure 2 
represents (a) the output and (b) input markets surrounding the farm sector.  Let S0(p) 
be the upward sloping supply curve and D(p) the downward sloping demand curve in 
the output market for the conventional agricultural commodity being modelled 
(Figure 2a).  The agbiotech innovation is assumed to be cost reducing.  Cost reduction 
means that for the same quantity y produced, the farmer is willing to accept a lower 
price and for the same price p, he is prepared to supply a higher quantity y.  Hence, 
cost-reducing agricultural innovations can be modelled as technical change resulting 
in a shift of the supply curve from S0(p) to Sc(p) on the condition that the innovated 
input is competitively supplied.  This supply shift leads to an increase in economic 
welfare, equal to the area ABDE, the so-called gross annual research benefits 
(GARB).   
 
The model presented in Figure 2a, has been used for numerous agricultural research 
evaluation and research priority studies (Alston et al., 1995).  However, most of the 
recent agbiotech innovations have been developed by private firms protected by 
intellectual property rights (IPR), such as patents, which confer monopoly rights to 
the discoverer (with some limitations).  This is a new phenomenon in the agribusiness 
sector.  The result is that prices for these inputs are higher than they would be in a 
perfectly competitive market.  Therefore, Moschini and Lapan (ML) (1997) bring 
along some new elements in the conventional analytical framework of welfare   9
economics.  They complete the framework by including the possibility that the 
innovation is protected by IPRs in the input market.  Thus, the correct evaluation of 
the benefits from R&D aimed at agriculture needs to account for the relevant 
institutional and industry structures responsible for the actual development of 
technological innovations.   
 
Let X(w) be the downward sloping demand curve of the farm sector for genetically 
engineered seed in the input market (Figure 2b).  The higher the price w, the lower 
demand  x will be for the improved variety due to the existence of alternative 
conventional technologies such as chemicals.  Once the R&D costs of the agbiotech 
firm are sunk, the firm is able to supply seed at a marginal cost c.  This is the cost of 
producing an additional unit of genetically engineered seed and is equal to the 
marginal cost of producing conventional non-GM seed.  In a perfectly competitive 
market, the GM seed price would approximate this marginal cost due to a continuous 
process of price competition.  However, the IPRs allow the firm to hold a temporary 
monopoly position, bounded of course by some limit pointed out by Lapan and 
Moschini (2000).  If the firm is the only player in the market, it faces the downward 
sloping demand curve for GM seed X(w).  The marginal return curve MR, or return of 
an additional unit seed sold on the market, can be easily derived from this demand 
curve (Figure 2b).  The firm will maximize profits by producing an amount GM seed 
equal to xm, where marginal cost c is equal to marginal return MR.  Since it is the only 
player in the market facing demand curve X(w), the firm is able to raise its price 
above the marginal cost c.  Even at a price wm, the farm sector is willing to buy xm 
units of the GM seed variety.  This monopoly price wm will maximize firm profits and 
will allow the firm to regain the high R&D costs via a so-called monopoly rent,   10
represented by area wmGHc.  Because of the fact that the monopolistic seed price wm 
is higher than the marginal cost c, i.e. the seed price which would emerge in a 
perfectly competitive market, farm-level benefits are lower and the corresponding 
supply shift is smaller (from S0(p) to Sm(p)).  The effects of a departure from the 
assumption of perfect competition towards monopoly are illustrated in Figure 2 by a 
shift of the supply curve from Sc(p) to Sm(p).  Total welfare increase will be equal to 
the sum of the shaded areas ABCF and wmGHc, instead of simply area ABDE as in the 
conventional model of Alston et al. (1995).  A part of the producer benefits (ABDE - 
ABCF) will flow to the input sector in the form of monopoly rents (wmGHc).  Until 
now, few studies have been published calculating the impact of agbiotech with the 
ML-model.  They are applied on typical USA export crops like Bt cotton (Falck-
Zepeda et al., 2000) and RR© soybeans (Moschini et al., 2000).   
 
However, equivalently with what Alston et al. (1997) pointed out in their study, 
extreme assumptions of monopoly or monopsony seem at least as inappropriate as one 
of perfect competition.  Indeed, different patents exist for the same phenotypic trait, 
e.g. RR® (Monsanto) and LL® (Aventis) for herbicide resistance.  Thus, the ML-
model, which focuses on the extreme setting of pure monopoly, might need to be 
adapted to account for a departure from monopoly to different oligopolistic settings.  
This can be visually done in Figure 2b by rotating the marginal return (MR) curve 
towards the demand curve (X(w)) in the input market (Fulton and Keyowski, 2000).  
If the MR curve in Figure 2b corresponds to the extreme position of monopoly in the 
input market, in the case of pure competition this curve would coincide with the X(w) 
curve.  An oligopolistic input market would then be an intermediary situation between 
these two extremes, with a marginal return curve situated somewhere between MR   11
and X(w).  In Figure 2a, a departure from monopolistic towards oligopolistic input 
markets can be visualized by shifting the supply curve from Sm(p) to somewhere 
between Sm(p) and Sc(p).   
 
Market Distortions Caused by Commodity Policies 
The benefits from agricultural research can be influenced by government policies that 
distort output and input prices.  Several studies have examined the research benefits 
under a variety of output pricing and other government policies.  The major findings 
from these studies are summarized in Alston et al. (1995).  The latter reshape the 
modelling framework for five market distortions caused by government intervention 
policies: (1) price supports, (2) output price ceilings, (3) subsidies on inputs or 
outputs, (4) output controls (quota systems), (4) import tariffs and import quotas and 
(5) export taxes. 
 
Since some of these government interventions are embedded in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, case studies evaluating the benefits of new 
technologies in the production of a particular commodity have to take into account the 
relevant institutional policies which interfere in the commodity market.  To illustrate 
the influence of distorting market policies on the size and distribution of research 
benefits, Figure 3 represents the quota system of the European common sugar market.  
This Common Market Organisation (CMO) is central in the case study of herbicide 
tolerant sugar beets.  The quota system is in place since the establishment of the CAP 
for sugar in 1968.  Each year the EU fixes an intervention price Pi from which it 
deduces the price levels of A-quota (Pa) and B-quota (Pb).  To each country an 
amount of A-quota (Qa) and B-quota (Qb) is allocated.  Historically, anticipating an   12
increase in consumption, these quotas have been fixed at a level, which is superior to 
domestic demand Qd (Combette et al., 1997), the quantity demanded at a price Pi, 
defined by the intersection of the demand curve (D) with the fixed intervention price 
Pi.  The production of C-sugar is not limited but it receives the world price (Pw), 
without price support.  Now consider two producing countries, characterized with 
supply or marginal cost functions S0 and S’0.  The marginal return curve (abcdef) is 
stepwise with a discontinuity at b and d.  S0 represents a high cost producer since it 
fulfils its A- and B-quota (his marginal cost curve S0 intersects with the marginal 
return curve at Qa + Qb), but is too expensive to produce any C-quota (Pw is lower 
than the intersection of marginal cost and return).  S’0 is the marginal cost curve of a 
low cost producer, who is able to supply an amount of unsubsidised C-sugar (Qc), 
after fulfilment of his A- and B-quota. 
 
Now, consider a technological innovation represented by a parallel shift of the supply 
curve (from S0 to S1) by an absolute cost reduction of K (in Euro/tonne).  The total 
producer benefits of this innovation are K(Qa + Qb), visualized by the shaded 
rectangle.  Since prices and quota are fixed, no direct price effect will occur on the 
domestic market as a consequence of the technological innovation.  In a free market, 
increased supply due to the innovation would result in lower prices if the farm sector 
faces an inelastic demand.  Therefore, within quota production is entirely protected 
from any price depreciation due to a technological change.  The producers (farmers 
and processors) capture the full benefits in the output market, while no benefits flow 
to consumers.  A low cost producer (S’0) will gain a ‘protected’ quota rent increase 
K’(Qa + Qb) from his A- and B-quota sugar, equivalent to high cost producers.   
Moreover, he will capture an extra benefit on the export market originating from his   13
C-sugar.  This benefit, however, is not protected from price depreciation, so it will be 
less than K’Qc.  From this example it becomes apparent that the specific institutional 
policies intervening in the commodity market shape profoundly the model.  An 
important conclusion is that there will not exist a unique simulation model for all 
agbiotech case studies, since it has to be adapted to the specific features of the 
Common Market Organisation (CMO) of each commodity being modelled. 
 
Producer Heterogeneity 
The argument that producers benefit if the cost of growing crops falls by adopting 
their alternative GM varieties depends critically on the belief that all farmers are 
identical in the agronomic factors they face, the management skills they possess, and 
the other technology they have adopted.  If farmers are different in these 
characteristics, no such easy test of producer benefit is available.  Moschini and 
Lapan (1997) show that privately funded R&D provides benefits to the farmers if the 
innovation resulting from R&D is drastic
1.  All things equal, the more concentrated is 
the seed and chemical industry, the more likely are seed prices and chemical prices to 
be raised to the point where an innovation becomes non-drastic (cfr. supra).  The 
notion of a drastic innovation is only relevant if all producers of the crop face the 
same costs and agronomic factors.   
 
Fulton and Keyowski (2000) provide some empirical evidence that the adoption of 
herbicide resistant canola
2 by Canadian farmers is best understood if the assumption 
that farmers are identical is relaxed and replaced with the assumption that they differ 
in terms of such characteristics as management ability, geographical location, age, 
education, farm size, product specialization and the degree to which they have   14
adopted conservation tillage methods.  Contradictorily, in spite of the fact that average 
production costs of the GM canola varieties were higher (due to lower
3 yields) than 
their conventional counterparts, adoption of these varieties has been very fast (from 4 
% of the total canola acreage in 1996 to 69 % in 1999).  Parallel to these observations, 
European field trials reveal analogous inconsistencies for transgenic oilseed rape, 
showing that net benefits only occur in areas of high weed pressure, in fields were 
problem weeds such as cleavers and poppies are difficult to control with conventional 
treatments and in fields with low soil moisture and high organic matter (Green and 
Booth, 1999; Booth et al., 2001).  The same inconsistencies have previously been 
reported in literature on the response of oilseed rape to herbicide use (Walker et al., 
1990).   
 
These data, however, are not contradictory if it is recognised that producers differ in 
certain respects.  Fulton and Keyowski (1999; 2000) develop a conceptual model in 
which producers are differentiated in some respect.  Their model shows that some 
producers benefit even if only a portion of the market switches to the new technology, 
i.e. the technology does not have to be drastic for there to be a producer benefit.  
Moreover, producers can benefit and a portion of producers will adopt the new 
technology, even when the latter appears to be priced higher than the old technology.  
Their methodology can provide an extension to the conventional welfare framework 
by refining producer benefits according to some differentiating factors in cases where 
average production budgets reflect that the innovation is non-drastic. 
 
   15
Consumer Heterogeneity and Labelling Policies 
Like the effect on farmers of agbiotech can only be understood if they are regarded as 
heterogeneous, the rise of consumer concerns over GM products suggests that also 
consumers are not homogenous but differ in their willingness to pay for GM versus 
non-GM products (Fulton and Keyowski, 2000).  Consumer concern about genetically 
modified food is one of the most notable features of agricultural biotechnology.   
Unlike US farmers who have seen agronomic benefits in the new technology and have 
quickly adopted transgenic crops, consumers have expressed reservations about the 
foods produced from these crops.  Consumer opposition to genetic modification 
started in Europe and has spread to other countries.  While labelling of food products 
satisfies consumer demand for the right to make informed consumption decisions 
(Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996; Caswell, 1998), the introduction of segregation and 
labelling raises a number of issues that affect everyone in the food chain.  One issue is 
the added costs that segregation and labelling introduce and the economic impact of 
these costs on consumers.  Several recent studies try to shed light on these potential 
costs (Miranowski et al., 1999; Buckwell et al., 1999; Bullock et al., 2000; Lin, 2000; 
Golder et al., 2000).  A second issue is that segregation and labelling activities create 
incentives for the misrepresentation and mislabelling of genetically modified food as 
traditional food. 
 
Giannakas and Fulton (2000) develop a theoretical framework to examine the 
consumption effects of genetic modification under alternative labelling regimes and 
segregation enforcement scenarios.  Their analysis shows that the relative welfare 
ranking of the “no labelling” and “mandatory labelling” regimes depends on: (1) the 
level of consumer aversion to genetic modification, (2) the size of marketing and   16
segregation costs under mandatory labelling; (3) the share of the GM product to total 
production; and (4) the extent to which GM products are incorrectly labelled as non-
GM products.   
 
The results of their paper can provide an explanation of policy decisions about genetic 
modification and labelling observed around the world.  Relatively low (or zero) 
consumer aversion to genetic engineering coupled with a reduced price of GM foods 
and significant segregation costs associated with mandatory labelling could be among 
the reasons why a “no labelling” policy has been adopted by countries like the United 
States and Canada.  Increasing consumer concerns, however, and the relatively high 
level of consumer trust in the food safety institutions in both countries could increase 
the relative efficiency of – and hence the consumer demand for – mandatory labelling.  
A relatively high aversion to genetic modification coupled with a lack of consumer 
price reduction for GM foods, due to market distorting policies (cfr. supra), would 
rationalize mandatory labelling, an outcome seen in various EU countries.  However, 
a high level of distrust of food safety and inspection systems can undermine the value 
of labelling.  This result sheds light on the demand for an outright ban of GM 
products by some European consumers, since faith in the food inspection system there 
has been reduced because of food safety scares such as the BSE crisis in the British 
beef industry and the Belgian dioxin crisis. 
 
But even in the case of mandatory labelling, the label itself can have an influence on 
the welfare effects associated with the labelling policy.  Crespi and Marette (2000) 
develop an analytical framework showing that the label “Does Contain” should be 
used if the ration of consumers with a strong reluctance for consuming GMO goods to   17
indifferent consumers is high, while the label “Does Not Contain” should be used if 
the ratio is low.  Public intervention is crucial for GMO labelling because sellers may 
be unable, or unwilling, to signal their products on their own.  The relevant variables 
for policy decisions, then, are not just the concerns of those citizens troubled by GMO 
goods, but also the ratio of reluctant buyers, as well as, the cost of labelling and who, 
ultimately, bears this cost.   
 
Mandatory labelling policies imply market segregation and should be modelled as 
such.  Desquilbet et al. (2000) provide a theoretical adaptation of the conventional 
welfare framework.  They include mandatory labelling by splitting the commodity 
market into a regular (GM or non-GM) and an identity preserved (IP) non-GM 
market.  In a first stage, they consider a hypothetic situation where consumers are 
indifferent between the attributes GM and non-GM (Figure 4).  Selling agricultural 
commodities involves handling costs, presented in Figure 4a by two supply curves.  
Srh takes into account these handling costs, while for Sr these costs are subtracted.  
Market equilibrium takes place at quantity qr = qrh and price prh.  The difference 
between  prh and pr  are the handling costs.  Identity preservation involves extra 
handling costs due to the need for keeping non-GM crops pure, testing and labelling 
under imperfect information.  Hence, the distance between the two supply curves Sih 
and Si is greater in the identity preserved market than in the regular one.  In the 
absence of GMO-reluctant consumers willing to pay a price premium for GMO-free 
commodities, no IP goods will be sold (qi = qih = 0) unless prices are equal or lower 
than the equilibrium price in the regular commodity market.  This explains the kinked 
shape of the demand function (fat line in Figure 4b). 
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In a second stage, new information about the potential risks of GM food differentiates 
the consumers in two groups: (1) consumers who do not care and (2) consumers who 
care.  The emergence of a GMO-reluctant group of consumers with a higher 
willingness to pay for IP food creates a demand for the latter, pushing up the inelastic 
part of the demand function in the IP market (Figure 5b).  If the handling costs of the 
IP system are not too high, market equilibrium can be reached and a non-zero quantity 
qi
1 = qih
1  of the IP commodity is traded at price pih
1.  The emergence of GMO-
reluctant consumers leads to a negative demand shift (from Drh to Drh
1) in the regular 
market resulting in lower prices (prh




Regular Commodity Market:     Identity Preserved Commodity Market: 
qr
1 = qrh
1 < qr = qrh     qi
1 = qih
1 > qi = qih = 0 
prh
1 < prh      pih
1 > pih 
pr
1 < pr     pi
1 > pi 
 
The result of this negative information diffusion of GM food is that consumers who 
do not care gain, due to lower prices of the regular commodity, while consumers who 
care loose, due to higher IP commodity prices.  Farmers loose, whether they grow 
GM or non-GM crops and will switch to alternative crops resulting in a positive 
supply shift of the latter.  GM gene and seed suppliers loose due to lower demand for 
their innovative inputs.  Finally, these effects can be dampened to a certain extent by 
technological changes occurring in the IP system by lowering IP handling costs 
(Desquilbet et al., 2000).   
   19
Thus, in a situation with GMO’s and identity preservation, the overall effect will 
depend on the relative importance of the supply shift due to technological change on 
the one hand, and the influence of negative information diffusion on the other hand.  
Whether farmers and consumers who do not care win, depends on the relative sizes of 
the supply shift due to technological change, the demand shift and the changes in 
handling costs for regular and IP commodities.  Consumers who care loose in any 
case, due to higher prices
4.  The agricultural input suppliers finally win, but maybe 
not as much as in the hypothetical case of homogenous, indifferent consumers. 
 
Environmental and Human Health Externalities 
There are many types of external effects in agriculture.  An externality arises when 
there is a spillover effect of one person’s actions on another person’s economic 
opportunities and where that effect is not fully compensated trough a market 
transaction (Alston et al., 1995).  Many people are concerned that the capacity of 
agricultural systems (globally of locally) is being depreciated too rapidly by excessive 
exploitation of the natural resource base.  Underlying this concern is an implicit belief 
that agricultural decision makers are discounting the future too heavily, that they find 
it optimal to consume the natural resource base too quickly, compared with some 
standard.  Two possible rationales are that (1) private discount rates are greater than 
social discount rates and (2) some individuals attach too little weight to the welfare of 
future generations.  Thus, the costs of environmental externalities, perceived by 
society, are inseparably linked to the definition of a discount rate, which is 
representative for the society as a whole.  The lower (higher) the discount rate, the 
more society attaches weight to the welfare of future (present) generations.   
   20
The decision-making rule for GMO’s can be described as comparing – explicitly or 
implicitly – the expected costs of their release with the expected benefits.  The release 
of the transgenic crop will be approved if the expected discounted sum of benefits 
exceeds the sum of the expected discounted costs.  Traditional cost-benefit-analysis 
could result in socially non-optimal allocation of resources because the value of 
delaying a decision and waiting for additional information is neglected.  Generally, 
the decision can be seen as one under temporal uncertainty and irreversibility.  Real 
option pricing theory has shown that under such circumstances, the benefits have to 
exceed the costs by a factor significantly greater than one to account for the option to 
delay the decision.  This factor is commonly called the hurdle rate (Wesseler, 2000).   
 
Wesseler (2000) derives two different scenarios, which represent an optimistic and a 
pessimistic view on the effects of transgenic crops.  The optimist assumes that 
transgenic crops will generate continuously but stochastic benefits.  Using 
conservative guesstimates for the parameters of the hurdle rate, he shows that the 
hurdle rate has at least a factor of two.  Under an optimistic view, additional benefits 
from transgenic crops should be at least two times the expected loss in biodiversity.  
The pessimist assumes that benefits, if at all, will be only available for a short period 
of time.  Surprisingly, this model results in lower hurdle rates compared to the 
optimistic one, which could be explained by the higher value of the option to delay 
the decision due to the positive trend in additional benefits in the optimists model.  
The results further suggest that a tax on transgenic crops or mandatory refuge areas 
decrease the hurdle rate and therefore support an earlier release. 
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Capalbo and Antle (1989) observe that much research by economists is devoted to the 
measurement of the social benefits of agricultural research trough the adoption of 
agricultural technologies.  Yet, little systematic effort was directed at the 
measurement of social costs caused by environmental damage and human health risk.  
The existing welfare economics framework has to be adapted to the valuation of 
externalities such as agricultural pollution.  The authors propose a research sequence 
of (1) quantifying the physical and biological relationships; (2) quantifying the 
economic relationships; (3) quantifying the effects of the externalities on the 
environment and human health; (4) valuing the market and nonmarket effects; and (5) 
conducting benefit-cost analysis incorporating information on the social valuation of 
market and nonmarket effects.  The paucity of data is a serious limitation to 
undertaking this research.  Moreover, the nature of the physical and biological 
relationships evolves over time as the production technology changes.  The time 
dependence of functional relationships causes the observed data to be nonstationary in 
the statistical sense.  They conclude by saying that cross-disciplinary research is 
needed to measure the social costs of agricultural externalities when research 
priorities have to be set. 
 
All of these issues, conceptually at least, can be considered in the framework of a 
conventional supply and demand model, allowing for a divergence between private 
and social costs or benefits from production.  This is similar to incorporating price-
distorting policies (cfr. supra) but different in that the distortions are not creations of 
governments (Alston et al., 1995).  The authors represent this by adding a constant per 
unit cost to the marginal private cost (or ordinary supply) curve.  This shifts the 
supply curve (now represented by the marginal social cost curve) to the left and   22
means that, if not corrected for externalities, markets would be systematically 
oversupplied and exhibiting a continuously present externality cost.  Thus, the effects 
of research-induced supply shifts have to be computed on producer surplus, consumer 
surplus, government revenues and those who bear the costs of externalities.  Then the 
total benefit is obtained as the sum of benefits and costs to all groups. 
 
In order to assess the total social costs of agbiotech innovations, reliable data about 
the potential positive (declining pesticide use, declining toxicity of pesticides) and 
negative externalities (gene flow risks, loss of biodiversity) of these technologies are 
needed, as well as – and this part is often neglected – data about the externalities of 
conventional and alternative technologies.  Conventional agricultural systems rely 
often on toxic pesticides, which leach into groundwater.  Even systems based on 
mechanical weeding rely on heavy machines compacting soils, enhancing soil 
erosion, consuming fuel and emitting exhausts in the atmosphere.  Since conventional 
agricultural techniques are already associated with some externalities, the correct 
evaluation of the total social costs and benefits of agbiotech has to take into account 
them by computing the change in these costs when agriculture moves progressively 
from conventional to agbiotech techniques.  If agbiotech applications in the EU are 
more environment-saving than conventional techniques, as they seem to promise, this 
would mean that the marginal social cost shift would be even greater than the 
marginal private cost shift and that net benefits (reduction of externality costs) are 
flowing to an important actor of the agbiotech diffusion chain: the environment. 
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Conclusions 
Fishel’s (1985) concern about the adequacy of conventional analytical techniques to 
examine the impact of modern agricultural biotechnology was legitimate.  Some of 
the crucial assumptions of applied welfare economics do not hold any longer in the 
case of agricultural biotechnology innovations.  Therefore, we review some 
modifications to the conventional methodologies measuring the size and distribution 
of agricultural research benefits, shaping the conventional welfare economics 
framework to the specific case of agricultural biotechnology in the European Union.   
 
First, some modifications are related to the specific features of commodity markets, 
like the existence of market power in the processing sector.  A second set of revisions 
is associated with the characteristics of modern agricultural biotechnology: imperfect 
competition in the input market, consumer heterogeneity, and the risk of 
environmental and human health externalities.  Thirdly, some modifications arise 
from the technology adoption process, like the incorporation of producer 
heterogeneity in adoption decisions.  Finally, the specific institutional settings of the 
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy shape the model and its outcomes 
profoundly. 
 
Any study aiming at assessing the size and distribution of the welfare effects of 
agricultural biotechnology in the European Union should take notice of these 
conceptual extensions to the conventional ‘welfare economics’ framework.  But 
besides these modifications, also an extensive set of uncertainties has to be taken into 
account, reviewed in the next working paper (Demont and Tollens, 2001). 
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Figure 2: Gross Annual Research Benefits (area ABCF) and Monopoly Rents 
(area wmGHc) Resulting from an Agbiotech Innovation (Moschini and Lapan, 


















Figure 3: Quota System of the European Common Sugar Market and Research 
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Figure 4  : Commodity Markets in the Presence of GMOs and Indifferent 



























Figure 5  : Commodity Markets in the Presence of GMOs and Differentiated 
Consumers (Desquilbet et al., 2000)   27
Reference List 
Alston, J. M., Norton, G. W. and Pardey, P. G., Science Under Scarcity: Principles 
and Practice of Agricultural Research Evaluation and Priority Setting, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1995, 585 p. 
Alston, J. M., R. J. Sexton and M. Zhang, The Effects of Imperfect Competition on the 
Size and Distribution of Research Benefits, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 79(1997), pp. 1252-1265. 
Benbrook, C., Evidence of the Magnitude and Consequences of the Roundup Ready 
Soybean Yield Drag from University-Based Varietal Trials in 1998, Ag 
BioTech InfoNet Technical Paper, n° 1, http://www.biotech-info.net, 
Benbrook Consulting Services, Sandpoint, Idaho, 13-7-1999, 18 p. 
Booth, E. J., Green, M. R. and de Both, G., Herbicide Tolerant Oilseed Rape in 
Europe: The FACTT Programme, Conference Proceeding, The 1999 Brighton 
Conference - Weeds, Brighton, November 15-18, 2001, 652 p. 
Buckwell, A. E., Brookes, G. and Bradley, D., Economics of Identity Preservation for 
Genetically Modified Crops, Final Report of a Study for Food Biotechnology 
Communications Initiative (FBCI), Food Biotechnology Communications 
Initiative (FBCI), 1999, 83 p. 
Bullock, D. S., Desquilbet, M. and Nitsi, E. I., The Economics of Non-GMO 
Segregation and Identity Preservation, Conference Proceeding, American 
Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Tampa, Florida, July 30 
- August 2, 2000, http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/aaea00/sp00bu03.pdf, 24 p.   28
Burton, M., James, S., Lindner, B. and Pluske, J., A Way Forward for Frankenstein 
Foods, Conference Proceeding, International Consortium on Agricultural 
Biotechnology Research (ICABR), Ravello, August 24-28, 2000, 405 p. 
Capalbo, S. M. and J. M. Antle, Incorporating Social Costs in the Returns to 
Agricultural Research, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
71(1989), pp. 458-463. 
Caswell, J. A., Should Use of Genetically Modified Organisms Be Labeled?, 
AgBioForum, http://www.agbioforum.org, 1998, pp. 22-24. 
Caswell, J. A. and E. M. Mojduszka, Using Informational Labeling to Influence the 
Market for Quality in Food Products, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 78(December 1996), pp. 1248-1253. 
Combette, P., E. Giraud-Heraud and V. Réquillart, La politique sucrière europeenne 
après les accords du GATT: Une analyse de quelques scénarios d'évolution, 
Economie et Prévision, 127(1997), pp. 1-13. 
Crespi, J. M. and Marette, S., "Does Contain" vs. "Does Not Contain": How Should 
GMO Labeling Be Promoted?, Working Paper, http://www.inra.fr/Internet/ 
Departements/ESR/UR/lea/Seminra/oct00.pdf, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Kansas State University, 2000, 26 p. 
Demont, M., and E. Tollens. "Uncertainties of Estimating the Welfare Effects of 
Agricultural Biotechnology in the European Union." Working Paper, n° 58, 
Department of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, 2001.   29
Desquilbet, M., Bullock, D. S. and Salhofer, K., Economic Effects of European Union 
GMO Labeling Policy, Conference Proceeding, American Agricultural 
Economics Association Annual Meeting, Tampa, Florida, July 30 - August 2, 
2000, 17 p. 
Falck-Zepeda, J. B., G. Traxler and R. G. Nelson, Surplus Distribution from the 
Introduction of a Biotechnology Innovation, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 82(May 2000), pp. 360-369. 
Fishel, W. L. "Considerations in Conducting Biotechnology Impact Studies." 
Economic and Sociological Occasional Paper, n° 1195, The Ohio State 
University, 1985. 
Fulton, M. and L. Keyowski, The Producer Benefits Of Herbicide-Resistant Canola, 
AgBioForum, http://www.agbioforum.org, 1999, pp. 85-93. 
-----,  The Impact of Technological Innovation on Producer Returns: the Case of 
Genetically Modified Canola, In: Lesser, W. H., eds., Transitions in 
Agbiotech: Economics of Strategy and Policy, Food Marketing Policy Center, 
Storrs, CT, 2000, pp. 41-57. 
Giannakas, K. and Fulton, M., Consumption Effects of Genetic Modification: What if 
Consumers are Right?, EPTD Discussion Paper, n° 19, http://www.ifpri.org/ 
divs/eptd/dp/eptdp69.htm, Environment and Production Technology Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, 2000, 34 p. 
   30
Golder, G., Leung, F. and Malherbe, S., Economic Impact Study: Potential Costs of 
Mandatory Labelling of Food Products Derived from Biotechnology in 
Canada, Phase I Report, Project Report,  http://www.agbios.com/articles/ 
2001023-A.pdf, KPMG Consulting, Ottawa, 12-1-2000, 44 p. 
Green, M. R. and E. J. Booth, The Familiarisation and Acceptance of Crops 
Incorporating Transgenic Technology (FACTT): A Summary of UK trials, 
Aspects of Applied Biology, 56(1999), pp. 35-41. 
Griliches, Z., Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological 
Change, Econometrica, 25(October 1957), pp. 501-522. 
Lapan, H. and G. Moschini, Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Innovation, 
Economica, 67(2000), pp. 525-542. 
Lin, W., Estimating the Costs of Segregation for Nonbiotech Corn and Soybeans, 
Conference Proceeding, International Consortium on Agricultural 
Biotechnology Research (ICABR), Ravello, August 24-28, 2000, 513 p. 
Miranowski, J. A., Moschini, G., Babcock, B. A., Duffy, M., Wisner, R., Beghin, J., 
Hayes, D., Lence, S., Baumel, C. P. and Harle, N. E., Economic Perspectives 
on GMO Market Segregation, Staff Paper, n° 298, 
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/isu/isu298.pdf, Iowa State University, 1999, 15 p. 
Moschini, G. and H. Lapan, Intellectual Property Rights and the Welfare Effects of 
Agricultural R&D, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79(1997), 
pp. 1229-1242.   31
Moschini, G., H. Lapan and A. Sobolevsky, Roundup Ready Soybeans and Welfare 
Effects in the Soybean Complex, Agribusiness, 16(2000), pp. 33-55. 
Nadolnyak, D.A., and I. M. Sheldon., "Simulating the Effects of Adoption of 
Genetically Modified Soybeans in the U.S." Paper presented at AAEA and 
CAES Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 5-8 August 2001. 
Pray, C. E., Ma, D., Huang, J. and Qiao, F., Impact of Bt Cotton in China, Conference 
Proceeding, International Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology Research 
(ICABR), Ravello, August 24-28, 2000, 143 p. 
Walker, K. C., Whytock, G. P. and Davies, D. H. K., Evaluation of Yield Response 
and Financial Benefits from Weed Control in Oilseed Rape in Scotland, In: 
Anonymous, eds., Proceedings Crop Protection in Northern Britain, 
Association for Crop Protection in Northern Britain, Invergowie, Dundee, UK, 
1990, pp. 301-306. 
Wesseler, J., Temporal Uncertainty and Irreversibility: A Theoretical Framework for 
the Decision to Approve the Release of Transgenic Crops, In: Lesser, W. H., 
eds., Transitions in Agbiotech: Economics of Strategy and Policy, Food 




   32
                                                                                                                                            
1 An innovation is drastic if it is priced lower than the existing technology, thus completely taking over 
the market.  An innovation is non-drastic if it is priced competitively with the existing technology. 
2 a Canadian oilseed rape variety 
3 Benbrook (1999) found similar evidence of this yield drag for herbicide tolerant soybeans. 
4 The same conclusions have been drawn by Burton et al. (2000) and Fulton and Keyowski (2000).   33
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